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3Abstract 
 
Communications policymaking increasingly relies upon large-scale databases manufactured and marketed 
by commercial organizations.  Data providers such as BIA Research, Nielsen Media Research, and 
Arbitron play a vital role in aggregating the data that policymakers, policy analysts, and policy advocates 
rely upon in policy deliberations.  In many ways, these data providers supplement the limited data 
gathering capacity of government bodies such as the FCC and NTIA and thereby help to bring a greater 
quantity of relevant data to bear on policy issues than would otherwise be possible.  Indeed, these data are 
utilized extensively by stakeholders with an interest in policy outcomes to conduct and submit studies that 
policymakers rely upon in their deliberations (often in lieu of conducting such research on their own). 
 
One unfortunate byproduct of this situation, however, is that, to the increasing extent that the data relied 
upon in policymaking, policy analysis, and policy advocacy are provided by commercial organizations, 
substantial inequalities in access to these data inevitably arise.  Specifically, significant actors in the 
policymaking process, such as academic researchers and public interest organizations, lack the financial 
resources of communications firms and industry associations to gain access to the data that are vital to 
conducting thorough, reliable, and persuasive policy research.  Policymakers themselves often find their 
research objectives inhibited by the enormous expense associated with the relevant large-scale 
commercial datasets, and thus find themselves increasingly reliant upon the analyses conducted by those 
stakeholder groups with the resources necessary to gain access to such data.  As a result of these 
information asymmetries, policy decision-making is likely to suffer, as the research inputs inevitably fail 
to reflect the full range of considerations across the full range of interested stakeholders.  This paper 
illustrates these issues via a case study of the FCC’s 2003 media ownership proceeding and offers 
suggestions for how the existing disparities in access to policy-relevant data might be addressed. 
 
4Necessary knowledge for communications policy: Information inequalities and commercial data 
access and usage in the policymaking process 
 
Introduction 
 
The communications policymaking process is becoming increasingly research-driven.1 As has 
been seen across all policy sectors, policymakers rely heavily upon both internally- and externally-
generated empirical studies in the formulation of, and justification for, specific policy decisions.2 This 
has proven to be a controversial trend, both within and beyond communications policymaking, as debates 
have arisen about the appropriate role, usage, and capabilities of empirical research in policymaking.3
Regardless of these disputes, it is safe to say that both the demand for – and utilization of – research have 
become more pronounced in communications policymaking.  Consequently, stakeholders seeking to have 
an impact on policy outcomes find themselves increasingly reliant upon research to effectively support 
their policy arguments.4
One aspect of this trend that has been neglected, however, involves the growing importance of 
data generated by large-scale commercial data providers to policymaking and policy analysis.  That is, 
market, audience, and content data gathered and aggregated by commercial organizations such as Nielsen 
Media Research,5 BIA Research,6 Arbitron,7 and Kagan Research8 play an increasingly prominent role in 
 
1 See Philip M. Napoli, The Broadening of the Media Policy Research Agenda. White Paper, Social Science 
Research Council, 4-8, available at http://www.ssrc.org/programs/media/publications/PhilipNapoli.1.Final.doc. (last 
visited June 6, 2006) (arguing that the media policy research agenda is broadening beyond economic/technological 
issues to account for political and cultural issues as well). 
2 See infra notes 12-60 and accompanying text.  
3 See infra notes 23-26 and 46-50 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
5 Nielsen Media Research is the primary provider of national and local television audience ratings in the United 
States and in many other countries around the world. Clients include broadcast and cable networks, advertisers, local 
stations and cable systems.  Nielsen also provides Internet audience data through its Nielsen NetRatings affiliates.  
See website at http://www.nielsenmediaresearch.com (last accessed June 6, 2006). 
6 BIA Research provides financial, ownership, and market data for the broadcast television, radio and newspaper 
industries in the U.S.  Clients include financial institutions, investors, and media organizations. See website at 
http://www.bia.com (last accessed June 6, 2006). 
7 Arbitron is the primary provider of national and local radio audience ratings in the United States. Clients include 
radio stations, networks, and advertisers. See website at http://www.arbitron.com (last accessed June 6, 2006). 
8 Kagan Research provides financial data, industry forecasts, and sector-specific newsletters for the cable, broadcast 
television, wireless, and motion picture industries.  Clients include financial institutions, investors, and media 
organizations. See website at http://www.kagan.com (last accessed June 6, 2006). 
5the research submitted to – and conducted by – the FCC.  These data providers often are the sole source 
of specific information that is central to developing portraits of media markets, audience behavior, or 
content availability,9 and are at the core of policy decision-making, policy analysis, and policy advocacy.  
However, these data sources also are often enormously expensive and are thus difficult to access.  And, in 
some instances, the access terms can be very prohibitive – in ways that can undermine the effective 
dissemination of the research.   
 This paper considers the implications of the prominence of commercial data in the 
communications policymaking process.  Specifically, this paper considers the kinds of imbalances in 
policy advocacy and policy decision-making that may be created by unequal access to these important 
data sources by the various stakeholders involved in the policymaking process.  Drawing upon theoretical 
and empirical work related to information asymmetries and knowledge utilization, this paper argues that 
the contemporary communications policymaking environment is one in which the disparity in resources 
across various stakeholder groups is amplified by the associated imbalances in access to the commercial 
data sources that are increasingly central to policy decision-making and to persuasive policy advocacy.  
This paper therefore proposes a number of solutions to correct this imbalance and thereby reduce the 
information asymmetries that characterize contemporary communications policy analysis and policy 
advocacy. 
 The first section of this paper provides background on the policymaking process and the role of 
research in this process, drawing upon the growing body of literature that focuses on knowledge 
utilization in policymaking.  This section documents the increasingly empirical orientation that has 
characterized policymaking as a whole and communications policymaking in particular.  This section also 
documents the importance of external policy analysts (i.e., scholars, advocates, industry associations, 
 
9 For an analysis of the economics of ratings firms, see Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn, and Anne Layne-
Farrar, Regulating the Raters: The Law and Economics of Ratings Firms 2 (2006) AEI-Brookings Join Center for 
Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-02 (on file with author) (“most ratings firms operate in highly concentrated 
markets”). 
6think tanks) and their research to policy decision-making.  This section then situates these trends within 
the concept of information asymmetries and their impact on policy decision-making. 
 The second section explores the privatization of the data that feed into contemporary policy 
analysis.  This section documents trends across policymaking and database construction in general, as 
well as within the specific context of communications policymaking.  This section includes a case study 
of the FCC’s 2003 media ownership decision10 in order to illustrate the prominence that commercial data 
sources can play in communications policymaking and policy analysis, as well as the complications that 
can arise from this reliance upon such sources.  This section documents the range of commercial data 
sources used both by the FCC and by those filing comments/analyses cited by the Commission in 
connection with its June 2003 Report and Order.11
The third section considers the normative arguments in favor of granting broader access to data 
sources to policy researchers.  This section outlines the social benefits associated with expanded data 
access, as well as the dangers and costs associated with a policymaking environment in which substantial 
data access disparities exist. 
 The fourth section offers a set of recommendations for developing expanded data access for 
policy researchers.  This section explores possible mechanisms for enhancing the role of the government 
in data gathering, as well as mechanisms (including legislation) for developing greater access to 
commercial data sources for policy researchers in ways that balance the financial imperatives of 
commercial data providers (whose adequate financial incentives are essential to the continued generation 
of these data sources) with the public interest considerations regarding the effective operation of the 
policymaking process.  The concluding section summarizes the key arguments presented in this paper and 
offers suggestions for further research. 
Research and Policymaking 
 
10 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003). 
11 Id. 
7Regulatory decision-making inevitably involves the blending of empirical findings with 
normative judgments.12 This, however, is a challenging balance to strike,13 and one that requires an 
integration of value judgments and logical calculations.14 Nonetheless, many observers of the 
policymaking process have identified a continued trend toward a greater reliance upon empirical research, 
as part of a greater “rationalization” of policy decision-making.15 Albaek describes the introduction of 
evaluation and policy research into U.S. policymaking in the 1960s and 1970s as “one of the most 
comprehensive attempts so far to allow research to make its original, relevant contribution to changing 
society for the better.”16
There have been a number of explanations for this development.  Some argue that it is a purely 
needs-driven phenomenon.  As the National Research Council has noted, “As the economy grows more 
complex and the population becomes more diverse, increasingly detailed data and data analyses are 
required for policies to match well with economic and demographic realities.  This is true not only for 
policy making, but also for policy assessment and evaluation.”17 Others take a more critical stance, 
seeing this trend as a mechanism for marginalizing the citizenry in the policymaking process as well as 
 
12 Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking. 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 666 
(2005).  See also Paul Sabatier, The Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative 
Agencies, 23 ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 396, 397 (1978) (“No policy decision can be based solely on technical 
information.  Normative elements invariably enter, whether the value choices come from the statute, the personal 
philosophies of administrative officials, or their efforts to balance the preferences of competing constitutiencies.”). 
13 GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE, ARGUMENTS, AND PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS, 5 (1989) (“how can 
one separate the scientific from the political and value components of policy issues that encompass both?”). 
14 Id. (“Since to say anything of importance in public policy requires value judgments . . . artificial separation 
between values and rational capacities is a threat to all notions of public deliberation and defensible policy choices. . 
. . facts and values are . . . intertwined in policy-making.”) 
15 DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING, 7 (2002) (describing the 
“rationality project” that she sees “at the core of American political culture since the beginning”). See also BRUCE 
BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, xi (1996) (noting that “the possibility of isolating objective truths from human values, and the ability 
to capture what is most important about public life with science, shapes both experts’ attempts to inform policy-
making and scholars’ struggles to define methodology for understanding political action”); Kurt Finsterbusch & 
Mary R. Hamilton, The Rationalization of Social Science Research in Policy Studies. 19 INT’L. J. OF COMP.
SOCIOLOGY 58 (1978) (“Social scientists are becoming increasingly involved in policy research”).  See generally,
Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (1991). 
16 Erik Albaek, Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policymaking. 28 POLICY 
SCIENCES 79, 81 (1995). 
17 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EXPANDING ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA: RECONCILING RISKS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, 17, (2005). 
8marginalizing the role of value judgments in policy decision-making.18 Regardless of the reason, this 
trend certainly can be described as a self-sustaining process, one in which the initial influx of empirically-
minded personnel into policymaking bodies creates internal motivations for empirical analysis, which in 
turn furthers the staffing of these bodies with similarly-oriented personnel.19 
These broad trends certainly characterize communications policymaking, where a stronger 
emphasis on research-driven policymaking developed within the Federal Communications Commission in 
the 1970s and 1980s,20 and the personnel make-up of the FCC shifted accordingly.21 In 1973, the 
Commission introduced its own internal research and planning enterprise, the Office of Plans and Policy, 
so that the agency would be better equipped with the data and analyses it deemed necessary to guide its 
decision-making.22
A common concern raised about this trend, however, involves the extent to which it represents 
legitimate efforts to bring greater objectivity and analysis to policy decision-making; or, rather, that 
research and analysis have been primarily utilized in support of pre-determined policy outcomes. From 
this latter perspective, “research is used as ‘political ammunition,’”23 serving a “legitimation” function in 
the realms of policymaking and policy advocacy.24 Sabatier summarizes this position well when he notes 
 
18 See, e.g., PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICY SCIENCES (1997); D. Torgerson, Between Knowledge 
and Politics: Three Faces of Policy Analysis. 19 POLICY SCIENCES 33 (1986). 
19 Sabatier, supra note 12 (“employees who are scientists or members of a profession with a tradition of empirical 
research also create significant internal pressures for technical analysis because of their training, their desire for 
esteem from their professional peers, and the enjoyment and sense of personal competence such research provides”). 
20 As was characteristic across policymaking sectors, economics was the primary discipline around which this 
greater empirical orientation in policymaking was organized.  See ROBERT CORN-REVERE, ECONOMICS AND MEDIA 
REGULATION. IN MEDIA ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 71, 83 (1993) (describing the FCC’s move away from 
an “intuitive model” of policymaking and the agency’s “newly discovered interest in the collection of economic data 
and analysis”).  See Philip M. Napoli, The Unique Nature of Communications Regulation: Evidence and 
Implications for Communications Policy Analysis. 43 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 656 (1999), for a 
discussion of the implications of this trend for communication policymaking 
21 WENMOUTH W. WILLIAMS, JR., THE IMPACT OF COMMISSIONER BACKGROUND ON FCC DECISIONS. IN MEDIA AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, 43 (M. Spitzer, Ed., 1993). 
22 See Philip M. Napoli, Government Assessment of FCC Performance: Recurring Patterns and Implications for 
Recent Reform Efforts. 22 TELECOM. POLICY 409, 417 (1998).  The Office of Plans and Policy was renamed the 
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis in 2003, at which point it was both expanded and restructured.  See 
Federal Communications Commission, Name Change of the Office of Plans and Policy, at 
http//hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231048A1.pdf (March 5, 2003).  
23 See Albaek, supra note 16 at 85. 
24 James M. Rogers, Surrendering the Ideal of Disinterestedness in the Policy Research Process: A Cautionary 
Note. 2 KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 6, 12 (1989). 
9that “it is quite likely that administrative agencies devote a considerable portion of their resources to the 
acquisition of technical information but that this information is often utilized to legitimate, rather than to 
influence, policy decisions.”25 The credibility of the research inevitably gets called into question from 
this standpoint, as policymakers who are not, in fact, seeking decision-making guidance from empirical 
research, but rather are seeking studies that support specific pre-determined policy outcomes, may not 
engage in appropriate scrutiny in either the commissioning or the assessment of individual pieces of 
research.26
However, others argue that this kind of political utilization of research and analysis is perfectly in 
keeping with principles of democratic deliberation, and that the notion of a truly objective and rational 
policymaking process is an ideal type that never has, and never will, characterize the realities of 
policymaking.27 Rather, policy analysis is better considered as a form of argument.28 According to 
Rogers, “It seems that the policy research community is gradually coming to accept the politicization of 
knowledge utilization.”29 As a result, policy researchers have become more comfortable with politicized 
uses of their work and even more willing to consciously and directly employ their research expertise in 
more overtly political manners.30 Similarly, analysts of the policymaking process have come to 
 
25 Sabatier, supra note 12, at 396.  
26Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public Health 
and Environmental Regulation. 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 79 (2003) (“Agencies might have numerous reasons 
to rely on weak or valueless studies to support regulations.  For example, either low-level staff or micro-managing, 
high-level administrators with political objectives might have both incentive and opportunity to commission or 
combine studies that lead to a predetermined result.  Malaise and inattention might also cause agency staff to include 
in their analyses studies that are not sufficiently scrutinized”). 
27 MAJONE, supra note 13, at 12-20, (discussing “decisionism”: the model of a completely rational and objective 
approach to policy analysis that fails to provide a “realistic view of the uses of knowledge and analysis in policy 
deliberation”).  See also Randall L. Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political 
Advice. 47 J. OF POLITICS 530, 531 (1985) (presenting a theoretical model illustrating the value and utility of biased 
information and selectively consulting information sources according to particular biases for policymakers). 
28 MAJONE, supra note 13, at 7.  (“The job of analysts consists in large part of producing evidence and arguments to 
be used in the course of public debate. . . . The arguments analysts produce may be more or less technical, more or 
less sophisticated, but they must persuade if they are to be taken seriously in the forums of public deliberation”). 
29 Rogers, supra note 24. 
30 Id. at 8 (1989) (characterizing uses of analysis as “strategic behavioral responses” in the policymaking and policy 
advocacy processes). 
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understand that politics and analysis can not be completely divorced.31 The key, however, is that both 
rational and political approaches to the policymaking process involve substantial reliance upon research 
and analysis, albeit for different purposes.32 
Not surprisingly, to the extent that there has developed a strong impetus for tighter linkages 
between research and policymaking,33 there also has developed a substantial body of literature examining 
if and how research is, in fact, being used.34 While the conclusions within this body of literature are 
wide-ranging, most relevant to this paper are the findings that research can impact policymaking in a 
variety of ways, and that this impact can be both direct and indirect.35 Indeed, one of the greatest 
challenges in the field of knowledge utilization research involves effectively capturing the variety of ways 
in which the use of a particular piece of research might take place.36 In some (perhaps rare) instances, the 
relationship between research and decision outcome may be very direct, with a particular study directly 
influencing a specific policy decision.  In other instances, utilization of research may take place at a more 
abstract level, impacting which issues policymakers choose to focus their attention on, or perhaps 
 
31 Bob L. Johnson, Jr., The Politics of Research-Information Use in the Education Policy Arena. 13 EDUCATIONAL 
POLICY 23, 25 (1999) (“In short, post-Great Society policy frameworks reflect an increased sensitivity to the 
political nature and use of research information in the policy-making process”). 
32 See MAJONE, supra note 13 at 33 (“it is wrong to assume that the only legitimate use of analysis is to assist the 
policymaker in discovering a solution to a problem.  Policymakers need retrospective (postdecision) analysis as least 
as much as they need prospective (or predecision) analysis, and probably more. . . As long as rationality is defined 
as choosing the best means to a given end, it is natural to consider retrospective justificatory arguments as being 
outside the pale of professional analysis – ‘mere rhetoric,’ propaganda, or rationalization.  However, this 
instrumental view is not an adequate characterization of the role of reason in human affairs”). 
33 See Daniel Breslau, The Political Power of Research Methods: Knowledge Regimes in U.S. Labor-Market Policy.
26 THEORY & SOCIETY 869 (1997), for an example of the frequent calls for stronger linkages between research and 
policymaking, (“social science research rarely has a discernible effect on policy decisions” at 870); See also Jan 
Hutjes, Policy Research: Between the Accumulation and Implementation of Knowledge. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 
10 (1991); James M. Rogers, Social Science Disciplines and Policy Research: The Case of Political Science. 9 
POLICY STUDIES REVIEW 13 (1989).  For examples that focus specifically on the communications policy context, see 
Philip M. Napoli and Nancy Gillis, Reassessing the Potential Contribution of Communications Research to 
Communications Policy: The Case of Media Ownership (in press) J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA xx 
(2006); Napoli, supra note 20; STEVEN S. WILDMAN, TOWARD A BETTER INTEGRATION OF MEDIA ECONOMICS AND 
MEDIA COMPETITION POLICY. IN A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 573 (1998). 
34 See, e.g., Albaek, supra note 16; Janice M. Beyer & Harrison M. Trice, The Utilization Process: A Conceptual 
Framework and Synthesis of Empirical Findings,. 27 ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 591 (1982); Rejean Landry, Moktar 
Lamari, & Nabil Amara, The Extent and Determinants of Utilization of University Research in Government 
Agencies. 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 192 (2003); Cheol H. Oh & Robert F. Rich, Explaining Use of Information in 
Public Policymaking. 9 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 3 (1996); Sabatier, supra note 12. 
35 David J. Webber, The Distribution and Use of Policy Knowledge in the Policy Process. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 
6 (1991), for a detailed discussion of the various uses of research in the policymaking process. 
36 See Landry, Lamari, & Amara, supra note 34 at 202. 
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influencing how a particular policy issue is framed.37 There may be a variety of stages in the decision-
making process in which research may have an impact.38 Indeed, when a somewhat broader notion of the 
“use” of research is employed, the apparent role of research in the policymaking process expands 
considerably.39 
Thus, as this review is meant to suggest, regardless of how research is used (or misused) in the 
policymaking process, its potential for influence has grown.40 As a result, those interested in the extent to 
which the mechanisms of the policymaking process reflect and serve the full range of relevant policy 
considerations need to consider the dynamics surrounding the generation of policy-relevant research.  
External Stakeholders and Policy Research 
 One key element of these dynamics involves the extent to which external stakeholders are serving 
an increasingly important research function in the policymaking process.  Many observers of the 
policymaking process suggest that the role of external analysts and researchers is becoming more 
prominent and more influential.41 There are normative reasons for this kind of outsourcing of the 
analytical work that informs policymaking.  According to the National Research Council, because the 
scope of research by governmental agencies is often narrowly focused, “data access by other researchers 
is necessary to ensure that alternative methodologies and uses are fully explored to advance social science 
 
37 See, e.g., Carol H. Weiss, Research for Policy’s Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research. 3 POLICY 
ANALYSIS 531, 533-34 (1977) (“The major use of social research in public policymaking may not be problem 
solving . . .  Research use appears to be a much more diffuse and circuitous process.  Evidence suggests that 
government officials use research less to arrive at solutions than to orient themselves to problems.  They use 
research to help them think about issues and define the problematics of a situation, to gain new ideas and new 
perspectives.  They use research to help formulate problems and to set the agenda for future policy actions.  And 
much of this use is not deliberate, direct, and targeted, but a result of long-term percolation of social science 
concepts, theories, and findings into the climate of informed opinion”).  Weiss labels this phenomenon the 
“enlightenment model of research.” 
38 See Landry, Lamari, & Amara, supra note 34 at 194.  The authors identify six stages of knowledge utilization: 
Reception; cognition, discussion, reference, effort, and influence, each ultimately reflecting different ways that 
research can be incorporated into the policymaking process. 
39 Id. at 202 (discussing when employing multiple stages of knowledge utilization into the research design, “findings 
suggest that university research is used more extensively than is commonly assumed”). 
40 See Oh & Rich, supra note 34 at 3 (“Whether policy processes are perceived as political or scientific activities, 
decision makers often face the necessity of using information in making complicated and dynamic decisions”). 
41 See Bimber, supra note 15 at 1 (“The numbers of these external experts [performing policy analysis] have 
increased dramatically in recent decades . . . forming what has been called the ‘fifth branch’ of government”). 
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knowledge and the design and evaluation of public policies.”42 The separation between researchers and 
policymakers is further explored by Weiss, who notes that “Researchers are not expected to participate as 
decision makers.  In the public policy sphere, their task has generally been to illuminate the consequences 
of alternatives in order that people in positions of authority can know what they will get and what they 
will give up when they select a particular course.”43 Academic researchers often are identified as playing 
a particularly important role in this process, serving as the “second community” in the knowledge 
utilization process that provides research to policy decision-makers (the “first community”).44 Within the 
context of communications policymaking, Bauer, et al. found that while some research and ideas are 
generated within policy-making institutions, “most originates from outside and needs to be introduced to 
policy-making and further processed by policy-makers.”45 Findings such as these highlight the 
importance of maintaining both the quantity and quality of external research, as policymakers are 
becoming increasingly dependent upon this research in the formulation of their policy priorities and in 
their choice of policy solutions. 
There are, of course, dangers inherent in such a system as well.  Perhaps the most obvious, and 
most compelling, involves the possibility of biased analyses being injected into the policy process by 
stakeholders with a vested interest in a specific outcome.  Such concerns become particularly acute in 
light of frequent observations that such external analyses do not necessarily receive sufficient scrutiny 
before they are used in policy formation.46 Indeed, numerous criticisms have been leveled over the years 
 
42 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17 at 38. 
43 Carl H. Weiss, Policy Research as Advocacy: Pro and Con. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 37, 38 (1991).  
44 See DANIEL COHN, JUMPING INTO THE POLITICAL FRAY: ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKING. INSTITUTE FOR 
RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, 3 (2006). 
45 Johannes M. Bauer, Sungjoong Kim, Steven S. Wildman, and Bella Mody, Making U.S. Telecommunications 
Policy: Who Participates and Who is Heard? The Role of Research and Ideas. White Paper, Quello Center, 
Michigan State University, 8 (2006), for further analysis of how stakeholders influence communications 
policymaking.  See John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, The Structure and Conduct of Corporate 
Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission, 10 J. OF ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
91 (2001). 
46 Linda R. Cohen & Robert W. Hahn, Science and Regulation: A Solution to Concerns Over Public Access to 
Scientific Data, 285 SCIENCE 535 (1999) (“At present, analyses used in policy-making are rarely checked carefully 
before big regulations are put in place”).  See also Wagner, supra note 26 at 67 (“Problems with the quality of 
science underlying regulations arise if an agency weights these low-quality studies too heavily or ignores or gives 
insufficient credence to high quality research”). 
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against the use of “junk science” in policy decision-making.47 Wagner and Michaels argue that policy 
concerns over the objectivity and quality of scientific research used in policymaking have misguidedly 
emphasized publicly financed research, to the neglect of external, privately funded and conducted 
research.48 They document the various mechanisms that frequently are employed by private stakeholders 
to intentionally bias the privately-funded research that frequently is injected into – and relied upon in – 
the policymaking process, such that private research appears to be far more suspect than the publicly-
funded research that has been the focus of regulatory attention.49 The authors therefore recommend that 
the exact same regulatory oversight mechanisms that currently are applied to publicly funded research be 
applied to privately funded research.50
What has been described, then, is a somewhat paradoxical situation: one in which policymakers 
increasingly rely upon research in their work, but at the same time are ceding more of this research 
function to external stakeholders.  In a policymaking environment that is increasingly research-driven, 
and in which outside stakeholders are expected to make the bulk of the substantial analytical contributions 
to the policymaking process, any stakeholder group’s ability to effectively advocate for specific policy 
outcomes is becoming increasingly tied to that group’s ability to conduct or commission relevant 
research.  The mindset of policymakers is often heavily weighted in favor of arguments based upon 
empirical data.  As has been noted within the context of environmental regulation, “comments not framed 
as ‘scientific input’ often remain ignored.”51 This is often equally true in communications policy 
contexts.  In 2003, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted, in response to an overwhelming tide of 
 
47 Wagner, supra note 26, at 79, (“Agencies might have numerous reasons to rely on weak or valueless studies to 
support regulations.  For example, either low-level staff or micro-managing, high-level administrators with political 
objectives might have both incentive and opportunity to commission or combine studies that lead to a predetermined 
result.  Malaise and inattention might also cause agency staff to include in their analyses studies that are not 
sufficiently scrutinized”). 
48 Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing 
the Quality of Public Research to Private Research. 30 AM. J. OF LAW & MEDICINE 119,  120 (2004) (“to the extent 
that there is a problem with regulatory science . . . the ‘sound science’ reforms miss the target by taking aim at 
public, rather than private, science”). 
49 Id. at 122-128 (describing tactics such as the falsification of data and research findings, ends-oriented biases in 
research design and reporting, and the suppression of adverse results). 
50 Id. at 148 (“we recommend that whatever oversight is given to public research (and the appropriate level is 
certainly open to question) should also be applied to private research”). 
51 See Tai, supra, note 12 at 666. 
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public comment against the relaxation of the FCC’s media ownership rules,52 that such comments should 
not be considered as evidence as, according to Powell, “they tend to be at a very generalized level.”53 
Information Asymmetries and Policy Research 
 It is within these dynamics that concerns about information asymmetries derived from inequitable 
data access arise.  A number of researchers across a variety of disciplines have explored the concept of 
information asymmetries in relation to the policymaking process.54 In some instances, the role of research 
has been a focal point for such analyses.  Tai, for instance, in an analysis of environmental regulation, 
identifies asymmetries in participants’ abilities to proffer information to agencies and to process and 
understand information they receive from agencies as a key factor that can lead to “interest-group 
domination by parties better able to generate, receive, and process information.”55
The institutional dynamics of the policymaking process in many ways inherently favor large, 
well-resourced commercial interests over those of citizens or public interest advocates.  As Tai notes 
(again, within the context of environmental regulation), “the complexities of participation may require 
significant resources to generate substantive public comments . . . ”56 A key element of “substantive” 
public comments increasingly involves empirical research.  Meaningful participation in the policymaking 
 
52 Future of Music Coalition, Citizens Urge FCC to Retain Current Media Ownership Rules: FCC Public Record 
Shows Overwhelming Opposition to Relaxation of Ownership Caps. (documenting that over 99 percent of 
individuals and organizations filing comments in the FCC’s proceeding opposed relaxation of the Commission’s 
media ownership rules), available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/news/PRFCCdocket.cfm (May 14, 2003). 
53 See Ann C. Bulkern, FCC Gets an Earful From Colorado, Denver Post, Mar. 23, 2003 at K-01, for an analysis of 
the public comments that generally supports Powell’s conclusions that the public comments “did not seriously 
address the specific economic, legal and policy questions asked by the Commission,”; Michael A. McGregor, When 
the “Public Interest” is not what Interests the Public. 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 207, 222 (2006).  See David Docherty 
& Michael Tracy, Scholarship as Silence, 43 J. OF COMMUNICATION 230, 234 (1993) for similar observations within 
the British context (“It was quite clear that in order to engage with public policy debates we would have to play a 
numbers game. Clever thinking, elegant essays, treatises on history, disquisitions on philosophy, values and culture 
were important but not enough if we were to be taken seriously by those with power over policy”). 
54 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Banks & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric 
Information. 36 AM. J. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 509 (1992); Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private 
Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J. OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 139 (1987); Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM.
POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 809 (1998); Tai, supra note 12 at 666. 
55 See Tai, supra note 12 at 666.  See also D. Nelkin, Scientific Knowledge, Public Policy, and Democracy: A 
Review Essay. 1 KNOWLEDGE: CREATION, DIFFUSION, UTILIZATION 106, 118 (1979) (“Scientific knowledge, like 
land, labor, and capital is a resource – indeed a commodity – and the ability to manipulate and control this resource 
has profound implications for the distribution of political power in democratic societies”). 
56 Supra note 51, at 666. 
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process therefore often requires the generation, or commissioning, of social science-based studies.  Of 
course, “Well-funded and organized entities, such as industries . . . can more easily afford to generate 
these studies than the lay public,”57 or, for that matter, the public interest organizations that often serve as 
surrogates for the public in many policy debates, or the scholarly community.  Ultimately, “There is little 
doubt that unequal resources produces an imbalanced pool of analytic input.”58 Such imbalances likely 
impact the integrity of the policymaking process whether the process is conceptualized as a primarily 
scientific or primarily political process,59 to the extent that the policy arguments of some stakeholders 
(those with research to support their arguments) likely receive substantially greater consideration by 
policymakers than the policy arguments of other stakeholders (those without supporting research).60
Privatization of Data 
 What has been described thus far, then, is a policymaking environment in which empirical 
research is increasingly influential in the policymaking process, in which a large portion of that research 
responsibility has been ceded to external stakeholders, and in which the resource differences between 
these stakeholder groups are substantial – all of which suggests a policy process that is highly unbalanced, 
purely from a research-generating capacity, in favor of certain stakeholder groups.  The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate how such imbalances may be compounded by another defining characteristic of the 
contemporary policymaking/policy analysis landscape (particularly in relation to communications policy) 
 
57 Id. 
58 See Rogers, supra note 24 at 14 (noting that “Unequal resources and uneven representation take on added 
importance when the focus is on the partisan use of analysis.  Inequality of resources becomes especially noteworthy 
when the cost of producing policy analysis ranges from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars.” 
59 See Keck, supra note 54 at 157 (“The theory of the information dilemma . . . proposes that a good deal of 
regulatory failure can be explained without recourse to any government failure or imperfection of the political 
system.  Government may be truly motivated by the public interest and may be as perfect as perfect may be; if in 
regulatory policymaking it relies on the regulated firms for information in order to assess the impact of changes in 
regulation on public welfare, it may nevertheless produce regulatory outcomes that are suboptimal from the point of 
view of the public at large, suboptimal from the point of view of the regulated firms, and suboptimal from the point 
of view of total utility”).  See also Sandra Braman, Facing Out: Researchers and Policy-makers. In SANDRA 
BRAMAN (ED.), COMMUNICATION RESEARCHERS AND POLICY-MAKING 221, 223 (2003) (“The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) conducts research on its own and solicits input from scholars regarding policy 
options, but too often relies almost exclusively upon data provided by corporations in the industries being 
regulated”). 
60 See Johnson, Jr., supra note 31 at 34 (1999) (“The amount and quality of information possessed by arena 
participants on any given issue and the skill with which they make use of this information are thus important 
variables in the policy arena”). 
16
– the increased privatization and commercialization of the core data necessary for rigorous policy 
analyses. 
Embedded within the broader trend of the privatization of many aspects of governmental 
authority61 is the more specific issue of the privatization of the data gathering mechanisms that feed into 
policy decision-making.  Across a variety of fields, there has been a trend towards the commodification of 
data and information that previously was treated as a public good.62 A recent Washington Post article 
illustrated the extent to which national security policymaking is becoming increasingly reliant upon data 
obtained from private vendors.63 Greenbaum details the decreasing role that the U.S. government has 
played in the generation of databases over the past thirty years, noting that in 1977 government-sponsored 
databases accounted for 56% of the American market, but that by 2002 this number had fallen to 6%.64
Reasons for this phenomenon are both economic and political, with rising database production costs 
coupled with mounting governmental costs in other areas accounting for the economic pressure; and 
lobbying from industry groups eager to fill – and profit from – the voids left when government agencies 
withdraw from data collection accounting for the political pressure.65 It is worth noting, however, that 
“This significant loss of government capital in the industry still paralleled a phenomenal increase in 
 
61 See generally, Alasdair Roberts, Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information. 51 U. TORONTO L. J. 243 
(2001). 
62 J.H. Reichman & Paul F Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and their Impact on 
Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 796, 809-810 (1999) (noting budgetary cuts for government 
funded data collection and the privatization of much raw data production).; J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, The 
Public Domain: A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist 
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 315, 351, 368 (2003) (“The private sector generates 
an ever-increasing amount of scientific data that are indispensable to academic research. . . . During the last ten 
years, there has been a marked tendency to shift the production of science-relevant databases from the public to the 
private sector”), for an historical perspective on the issues of database access and database protection that arise from 
this privatization process.  See Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning form the Past in the Database Debate. 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 879 (2001). 
63 Arshad Mohammed & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Mining. WASHINGTON 
POST, June 15, 2006, at D3, (“As federal agencies delve into the vast commercial market for consumer information, 
such as buying habits and financial records, they are tapping into data that would be difficult for the government to 
accumulate but that has become a booming business for private companies.  Industry executives, analysts and 
watchdog groups say the federal government has significantly increased what it spends to buy personal data from the 
private sector . . .. They expect the sums to keep rising far into the future”). 
64 Dov S. Greenbaum, The Database Debate: In Support of an Inequitable Solution, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 
480 (2003). 
65 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62 (2003) at 368-369 (“The budgetary pressures on the government are both 
structural and political in nature”). 
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growth of the industry, indicating that the degree of private investment has more than made up for the 
government’s pullback.”66 The financial incentives for government agencies to move out of the data 
collection enterprise can, of course, be substantial, as funds can be freed up for other activities.67 The 
danger that arises, however, involves how the terms of access available to other users of the data change 
as the data move from public to private hands.68 
As these data move to private hands, researchers increasingly find themselves at the mercy of the 
often prohibitive pricing platforms and often very restrictive licensing conditions of the commercial data 
providers. 69 And there are, at this point, no regulations or policies directed at specifying access 
parameters or price ceilings that commercial data providers must abide by when their data are sought for 
policy-relevant research.  As Reichman and Uhlir argue, “The lack of any restraints on licensing, 
especially on sole-source data providers, adds to the dangers inherent in the creation of a strong exclusive 
property right in collections of data. . . . Without a concomitant duty to deal fairly and reasonably with 
public-interest users, these combined powers could lead to high prices for data and to the imposition of 
harsh and oppressive terms concerning both access and subsequent uses of data that would especially 
disadvantage academic researchers.”70 The ultimate danger of such scenario is a “chilling effect on data-
intensive research.”71 
66 See Greenbaum, supra note 64 at 480-481. 
67 Charles Brill, Legal Protection of Collections of Facts. 1998 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 48 (1998) (“By 
promising the government agency free, or reduced cost access to the database, a database provider may convince the 
government agency to cease publishing the information, thereby allowing the government agency to spend its 
resources on other projects”). 
68 Id. (“the monopoly power granted to the database publisher may allow the database provider to price the database 
service beyond the means of some users of the information”). 
69 Tomas A. Lipinski, The Commodification of Information and the Extension of Proprietary Rights into the Public 
Domain: Recent Legal (Case and Other) Developments in the United States, 22 J. BUS. ETHICS 63, 71 (1999) (“An 
information owner may also ‘negotiate’ for enforceable rights (contract or license) which may in essence remove 
any public domain rights such as fair use from the user.  Here an individual user is forced between choosing either to 
not have access to the information (through foregone purchases) or having access to information but on the 
conditions imposed by the seller (information owner)”). 
70 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62 (1999), at 814-815. 
71 Id. at 819. 
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Recently, we have seen efforts to enhance the control that database providers have over the usage 
of the information they provide.  For instance, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act72 was an 
effort that, had it passed, would have prevented an individual from extracting, or using in commerce, a 
substantial portion of the information contained in a database compiled by another party, even if the 
information contained within the database was factual in nature (facts generally not being copyrightable), 
so as to harm the actual or potential market for the product.73 Although the Act included language that 
granted permission to individuals to extract data for nonprofit, educational, scientific, or research 
purposes in a manner that did not harm directly the actual or potential market for the product, Pollack 
points out the glaring loophole in such apparently permissive language: “Scientific databases are used 
largely by scientists and educators.  A scientist who uses a scientific database for free is, therefore, 
hurting the database’s market.”74 Similarly, Reichman and Uhlir warn that “Especially serious problems 
seem likely to arise when the public research community becomes the target market for the commercial 
data supplier, and there is a resulting tension between freedom of contract and the needs and capabilities 
of the nonprofit research sector.  In principle, one expects that a supplier will not price itself out of the 
market.  In practice, some science publishers have adopted exorbitant pricing strategies that do limit 
scientists’ abilities to access and use their products.”75 Consequently, those under-resourced providers of 
external policy analysis (scholars, public interest/advocacy organizations) find themselves at a 
tremendous disadvantage in terms of their ability to provide relevant information and analysis to 
policymakers.  And policymakers – and their decision-making – then suffer as well. 
 
72 H.R. 2652, 105th Congress (1998). 
73 Comparable legislation already has been passed by the European Union (European Union Database Directive).  
See Mark Schneider, The European Union Database Directive, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 558 (1998). 
74 Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the 
Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 117 (1999). 
75 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62 (2003), at 460.  The logic of this sort of apparent irrationality in pricing may 
be that the research community ultimately represents such a small revenue source for these data providers that 
whatever miniscule risks of sale to a policy researcher carries in terms of harming other revenue streams may be 
sufficient to overcome any willingness to price the product more accessibly to the research community.  The extent 
to which the commercial data providers in the media sector have begun to consider the research community as a 
distinct market is illustrated by the recent appearance of data providers such as Nielsen Media Research at exhibit 
booths at academic association meetings such as the annual Broadcast Education Association conference. 
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Concerns such as these do, of course, need to be weighed against the economic imperatives 
facing commercial data providers.  The collection and aggregation of the type of data used in 
policymaking are incredibly expensive.  And, to the extent that this sector has become privatized, 
sufficient financial incentives need to be in place to encourage the continued creation of such databases, 
absent a return to greater government involvement in the collection and dissemination of policy-relevant 
data.76 Ultimately, then, the somewhat paradoxical situation is one in which “Although society has a 
strong interest in encouraging the creation of valuable databases, society also has an opposing interest in 
open access to the factual information comprising the databases.  Therefore, society’s grant of protection 
to database compilers attempts to strike a balance between the rights of the database producers to profit 
from their own labor and society’s interest in access to the information.”77 According to many analyses, 
the balance may currently be tilted in favor of the commercial database vendors.78
This trend towards the privatization of policy-relevant data, and the tensions between the interests 
of the data providers and the interests of the policy analysis communities, have been particularly 
pronounced in the area of communications policy.   The deregulatory trend of the past 30 years has been 
characterized in communications policy by a continued withdrawing by the FCC from gathering various 
forms of standardized data from the organizations under its regulatory authority.79 Thus, for instance, 
broadcast license renewal requests, which once required the submission of a substantial amount of 
information regarding licensee performance, now take the form of a simple “postcard renewal,” in which 
 
76 See Charles R. McManis, Database Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.REV. 7, 
23 (“The compilation of a database requires substantial investment.”) 
77 See Brill, supra note 67 at 3. 
78 Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and 
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 600 (2000) (arguing that legislative 
efforts to protect commercial database providers are based upon insufficient evidence of the threat, or reality, of 
significant piracy).  See supra note 62, at 460. 
79 John Dunbar, A Penchant for Secrecy: Why is the FCC so Determined to Keep Key Data from the Public? Center 
for Public Integrity 1 (2003), available at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18 (last accessed 
June 6, 2006) (quoting Andrew Schwartzman of the Media Access Project: “When the agency deregulates, and stops 
collecting data, they say we’re going to rely on marketplace forces and public complaints to make us aware of 
problems.” However, the lack of available data “takes away the means of members of the public to do that 
monitoring”). 
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little, if any, substantive information is gathered from the licensee.80 The Commission used to gather 
detailed employment data in connection with its Equal Employment Opportunity rules, but the scaling 
back of these rules has been accompanied by a scaling back of the quantity and quality of the employment 
data the Commission gathers.81 The Commission used to gather cable system subscriber data, but stopped 
gathering such data after an initiative to deregulate the cable industry was implemented in the 1990s.82 
An earlier deregulatory period led the FCC to cease gathering financial statements from broadcasters.83 
Access to such data must now be obtained from a growing array of commercial data providers.  
Industry financial and ownership information, for example, is now provided primarily by an organization 
called BIA Research,84 which aggregates television, radio station, and newspaper revenue, market, 
ownership, and ratings/circulation data into a large, comprehensive database that even the FCC relies 
upon heavily for its own analyses.85 Similar information for the cable industry, which the FCC used to 
obtain regularly, now is gathered and supplied primarily by Kagan Research.86 Today, in order to obtain 
the kind of information about television station programming practices that used to be gathered by the 
FCC in its license renewal process, researchers must consult television program schedule databases 
supplied commercially by organizations such as Tribune Media Services.87 Reflecting these trends, a 
report by the Center for Public Integrity noted that its efforts to construct a database of media companies 
was repeatedly hampered by the lack of relevant publicly available data, and that very little of the relevant 
 
80 See Revision of Applications for Renewals of License of Commercial and Non-Commercial AM, FM, and 
Television Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740,  741 (1981). 
81 Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies, Second 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 22843, 22858 (Dec. 21, 2001). 
82 Supra note 79. (noting that incomplete cable system subscriber data were found in the FCC’s Cable Operations 
and Licensing System database due to the fact that “the FCC stopped collecting it after ‘deregulation’ of the industry 
in 1994”). 
83 James G. Webster, The Role of Audience Ratings in Communications Policy. 12 COMM. & THE LAW 59, 63 (1990) 
(“the FCC stopped collecting financial statements from broadcasters several years ago”). 
84 See http://www.bia.com (Last visited June 30th, 2006). 
85 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, par. 274 (2003) (“The Commission traditionally has relied on BIA’s 
Media Access Pro database to obtain information about particular Arbitron Metros”). 
86 See http://www.kagan.com (Last visited June 30th, 2006). 
87 See http://tms.tribune.com (Last visited June 30th, 2006). 
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data resided with the FCC.88 These examples support Media Access Project’s Harold Feld’s observation 
that “Self-generated and self-directed research . . . accounts for a vanishingly small amount of FCC 
data.”89 
There are, of course, other data sources, such as the audience ratings data provided by firms such 
as Nielsen (for television)90 and Arbitron (for radio)91 that traditionally have been commercially 
generated.  These data sources, too, are becoming increasingly central to contemporary communications 
policy analysis,92 particularly in light of the trend toward economically-oriented analyses described 
above, as well as the recent trend toward better integrating analyses of audience behavior and media 
usage into the policy decision-making process.93 And thus, while the government has never been 
involved in the creation of such data, such data are becoming increasingly important in the analyses that 
policymakers conduct and rely upon.94
Obtaining the relevant data from the private sector can often prove difficult, with price being the 
primary impediment.  One might argue that since databases are public goods,95 the sellers of these 
 
88 Supra note 79.  (“When the Center for Public Integrity was constructing its database of media companies, staff 
researchers were repeatedly referred by FCC staff to private companies for basic information on ownership, 
audience reach and cable subscribers.  Getting market share information, which is key when reviewing whether 
broadcasters are within existing FCC regulations that limit the number of households that any one owner can reach, 
was all but impossible without going outside the agency”). 
89 Harold Feld, FCC Practices Regarding Gathering Data, Processing Data, and Presenting Data: An Advocate’s 
Perspective. In P.M. Napoli (Ed.) Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning, Metrics, and the Public Interest 
Conference Report  87, 88 (2004) at 
http://www.fordham.edu/images/Undergraduate/communications/conferencereport.pdf (Last visited June 30th, 
2006). Feld goes on to note that “The FCC rarely compels the production of data on an industry-wide basis.” 
90 See http://www.nielsenmediaresearch.com (Last visited June 30th, 2006). 
91 See http://www.arbitron.com (Last visited June 30th, 2006). 
92 Supra note 83 at 60-66 (1990). 
93 See Napoli & Gillis, supra note 34 (illustrating a “broadening analytical perspective” within the context of media 
ownership that accounts for issues such as “how citizens use different media technologies to obtain information; 
if/how media content varies in accordance with variations in market and ownership conditions; what factors 
contribute to biased or ideologically slanted news content; and what criteria should be employed in defining an 
information source and the magnitude of its impact”).  See also Marc Raboy, Bram Dov Abramson, Serge Proulx, & 
Roxanne Welters, Media Policy, Audiences, and Social Demand: Research at the Interface of Policy Studies and 
Audience Studies. 2 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 95, 96 (2001) (urging a “closer dialogue between scholars working 
in what ought to be seen as related areas of communication research: policy studies and audience studies”). 
94 Supra note 83 at 60-66 (1990), for a discussion, for example, of the range of policy questions that can be 
investigated via the use of ratings data. 
95 The term “public goods” in this case refers to goods that are “characterized by their nonrival and nonexcludable 
properties.  The former means it costs nothing to provide the good to another person once someone has produced it, 
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databases would be willing and able to make the data available to under-resourced groups (such as 
scholars or public interest/advocacy organizations) at a dramatically reduced price.96 In reality, these data 
providers often do just that, though these dramatically reduced prices often can still be substantial by 
scholarly and/or non-profit standards.  Also related to this issue is the dynamics of the subsidization of 
data access.  That is, most communications-related commercial databases are funded primarily by clients 
from within these industries.97 Should these database providers then make their data available to the 
scholarly and/or public interest/advocacy communities at a dramatically reduced rate, these providers are 
vulnerable to criticism from their primary constituency.  Specifically, the database provider’s major client 
list may take issue with their substantial subscription payments being used to essentially help subsidize 
much less expensive data access for other constituencies – constituencies that ultimately may use the data 
to produce research highly critical of these very same communications firms.98 Thus, there are more than 
basic pricing issues to be navigated by commercial database providers who produce information relevant 
to communications policymaking and policy advocacy. 
 In sum, the concurrent trends of the increased need for robust empirical analysis in order to 
meaningfully participate in the policy process and the increased privatization of much of the data 
necessary for such analyses, create a situation in which the resource imbalances that characterize the 
stakeholder dynamics in the policymaking process can become magnified and contribute to even greater 
imbalances in terms of the analyses that different stakeholder groups are able to bring to bear on 
individual policy issues. 
Case Study: Media Ownership 
 
that is, it tends to have zero marginal cost.  The latter means that once such a good has been produced, the producer 
cannot exclude others from benefiting from it.” See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62 (2003) at 362. 
96 Supra note 83 at 68 (1990) (discussing specifically ratings data: “Like other kinds of information, ratings are a 
‘public good.’  That is, the cost of producing ratings is largely independent of the number of people who consume 
them.  Because policy makers engage in secondary analysis of data that were collected for another purpose, the 
ratings service can, in theory, price the data very inexpensively”). 
97 PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS 27 (2003). (discussing within the context of audience data, “Media 
organizations influence the structure and behavior of measurement firms because, like advertisers, the media 
industries are major clients of audience measurement firms”). 
98 See supra note 83 at 69 (referencing specifically ratings data: “Indeed, there is no guarantee that the ratings 
companies will agree to provide data at all.  They may fear offending an established client or being drawn into legal 
battle if their data are used in a proceeding”). 
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As has been argued, the situation in communications policy regarding the centrality of privately 
generated databases to effective policy analysis is particularly pronounced.  Commercial databases 
ranging from television and radio audience ratings, to industry financial information, to newspaper 
circulation figures, provide the bases for the kinds of analyses that are at the core of many 
communications policy decisions.  This section illustrates this point via a case study of the FCC’s highly 
publicized, and highly controversial, media ownership proceeding.99 In this proceeding, the FCC voted to 
relax a number of restrictions on the common ownership of media outlets.100
This proceeding also was characterized by the relatively rare phenomenon in which the FCC 
commissioned twelve empirical studies in advance of its June, 2003 decision, which were conducted both 
by internal staff members and by outside scholars and commercial organizations.101 This proceeding is 
also particularly illustrative in light of the controversies that arose in the wake of the Commission’s 
release of these twelve studies.  Specifically, the issue of commercial, proprietary data and the appropriate 
level of access that should be provided to such data in policymaking contexts came to the forefront of the 
media ownership proceeding.  In October of 2002, the FCC released its twelve studies addressing various 
dimensions of the media ownership issue.102 These studies were part of what FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell declared “the most comprehensive look at media ownership ever undertaken by the FCC,”103 and 
ultimately figured prominently in the Commission’s eventual decision on the media ownership 
proceeding.104 When external stakeholders such as scholars and public interest advocates sought to verify 
 
99 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003). 
100 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003).  (relaxing rules limiting common ownership of television 
stations and newspapers within individual markets, as well as rules limiting multiple television station ownership 
within and across media markets. 
101Federal Communications Commission, News Release: FCC Releases Twelve Studies on the Current Media 
Marketplace (October 1, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A1.txt (Last 
visited June 15, 2006). 
102 Id. See also, all twelve studies are accessible at: http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (Last visited June 
30, 2006). 
103 Supra note 101. 
104 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003). 
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the claims of these studies via reanalysis of their underlying data, their requests were initially denied.105 
Under substantial pressure,106 the FCC eventually relented, though only marginally.  Date for eight of the 
twelve studies were made available on-line in November of 2002107 Also in November of 2002, the 
Commission released a Protective Order108 that granted limited access to the underlying data for the 
remaining four studies under highly restricted terms.  These limitations on access were enforced due to 
the proprietary nature of the commercial data underlying these four studies.109 Those seeking to review 
the data for these four studies were required to sign a Declaration promising to abide by the terms of the 
Protective Order.  Access to the data would be limited to on-site access at FCC headquarters.110 No 
removal or copying of the data were permitted,111 though reviewing parties were permitted to conduct 
their own analyses with the data.112 Of course, conducting such analyses on-site, under the time 
 
105 Supra note 79 at 1 (2003) at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18 (last accessed June 6, 
2006) (“The FCC’s reliance on non-government, private data is so ingrained that when public interest groups asked 
for access to data underlying a series of media ownership reports . . . the FCC relented only after issuing a quasi 
judicial ‘protective order’ meant to keep the information secret”). 
106 Eric Alterman, Think Again: Falling Upward at the CPB 1 (April 21, 2005) (describing efforts of public interest 
groups to gain access to the underlying data for the media ownership studies), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=569645 (Last visited July 6, 2006) 
107 Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC’s Media Bureau Adopts Procedures for Public Access 
to Data Underlying Media Ownership Studies and Extends Comment Deadlines for 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review of Commission’s Media Ownership Rules (November 5, 2002) at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-02-2980A1.pdf (Last visited July 6th, 2006). 
108 Federal Communications Commission, Protective Order (November 5, 2002), at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-02-2981A1.pdf (Last visited July 6th, 2006). 
109 Id. (“This order establishes procedures for review by interested parties of the proprietary underlying data for four 
of those twelve studies”). See also, Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC’s Media Bureau 
Adopts Procedures for Public Access to Data Underlying Media Ownership Studies and Extends Comment 
Deadlines for 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of Commission’s Media Ownership Rules (November 5, 2002),at  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-02-2980A1.pdf (Last visited July 6th, 2006) (“For four of 
those . . . studies, the authors created data sets using proprietary information licensed to the author and/or the 
author’s employer for purposes excluding public dissemination”).  The four studies at issue were: C. Anthony Bush,  
On the Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio and Broadcast Television Advertising in Local Business Sales 
(2002); George Williams and Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and 
Finance (2002); Keith Brown and George Williams, Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio Markets 
(2002) ; and Joel Waldfogel, Consumer Substitutability Among Media (2002), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (Last visited June 30, 2006). 
110 Supra note 108 (“The Data Sets shall be maintained by the Commission for inspection at its headquarters 
consistent with the terms of this Protective Order”). 
111 Supra note 108 (“Authorized representatives may not remove Data Sets, or copies thereof, from agency 
headquarters”). 
112 Supra note 108 (“Reviewing parties may use information derived from the Data Sets to conduct their own 
analyses.  Moreover, any such calculations or other analyses performed by the Reviewing Party using information 
derived from the Data Sets that do not reveal protected information shall not be considered part of the Data Set.  
However, a Reviewing Party’s calculations, analyses or other derivate materials, the contents or outcomes of which 
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limitations imposed on access to the data would prove quite difficult; and thus, this arrangement hardly 
represents an ideal solution to the issue of access to the commercial data used in policy decision-making.  
It is worth noting that the Commission did offer, as an alternative, that “Outside parties also may obtain 
licenses from any or all licensors of the underlying data to evaluate the results of the studies and/or 
develop other studies that will contribute to the record in the proceeding.”113 
Given these circumstances, the media ownership proceeding probably can not be considered 
representative of the role that commercial data play in communications policymaking.  Rather, it 
represents an extreme scenario that illustrates the degree to which commercial data sources can factor into 
the communications policymaking process.  To illustrate this extreme, the media ownership Report and 
Order was analyzed as follows.  First, all references in the Report and Order were analyzed to determine 
whether they referenced a specific study. Referenced studies submitted to the FCC as part of formal 
comments filed with the Commission, as well as studies (published or unpublished) referenced directly by 
the FCC were included in the analysis (including the Media Ownership Working Group studies).  Next, 
these studies were obtained, and their methodologies analyzed, to determine which, if any, commercial 
data sources were utilized in the analysis.  Studies submitted as part of formal comments were obtained 
via retrieval of the comments through the Electronic Comments Filing System (ECFS) available on the 
FCC’s home page.114 Finally, all of the references in the Report and Order also were analyzed to 
determine which, if any, commercial data sources (such as industry statistical sources, or ratings reports), 
were referenced by the FCC directly in the Report and Order, independent of their use in any particular 
study.  These efforts were undertaken simply to provide a thorough catalog of the range of commercial 
data sources that can have a bearing on a particular communications policy issue.  In addition, each data 
source was associated with the appropriate category(ies) of stakeholder group(s) – FCC, industry, 
 
do reveal protected information, shall be used and treated by the Reviewing Party in the same fashion as the 
underlying Data Sets used in such calculations, analyses and derivative materials under the terms of this Order”). 
113 Supra note 107. 
114 See http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (Last visited July 6, 2006). 
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academic, or public interest organization – depending upon which of these stakeholder groups utilized the 
data source.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
_____________________ 
As Table 1 illustrates, 40 different commercial data sources were utilized in the analyses that 
contributed to the FCC’s media ownership decision.  These sources ranged from large scale databases 
(such as BIA and Nielsen data), to annual industry directories (such as the Broadcasting & Cable 
Yearbook), to a wide array of industry financial reports (such as those provided by Kagan Research on the 
cable industry).  The FCC Media Ownership Working Group’s Study #1, A Comparison of Media Outlets 
and Ownership for Tel Selected Markets, 1960, 1980, 2000, alone utilized six different commercial data 
sources, including the BIA Master Access Pro database, along with five different commercially published 
directories of television, cable, and print outlet information.115 Note that these results likely under-
represent the range of commercial data sources used in relation to this policy issue, as only those sources 
that were cited directly by the FCC in the Report and Order, or that were part of studies cited directly in 
the Report and Order were included in the analysis.  Data sources utilized in any studies submitted to – 
but not referenced by – the FCC would not be reflected in Table 1. 
Of perhaps equal interest is the information contained on the right side of the table, which 
identifies which stakeholders in the process utilized the data.  As the table indicates, by far the most 
common users of the relevant commercial data sources were the FCC and industry stakeholders (utilizing 
24 and 23, respectively, of the 40 data sources listed in the Table1).  As was noted previously, the extent 
to which the Commission engaged in its own research in conjunction with this proceeding was somewhat 
uncharacteristic, which may account for the impressively wide array of data sources the agency itself 
drew upon in connection with this proceeding.  Much less common was data usage by either public 
 
115 Scott Roberts, Jane Frenette, and Dione Stearns, A Comparison of Media Outlets and Owners for Ten Selected 
Markets: 1960, 1980, 2000, 5 (2002) (See Appendix listing data sources), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (Last visited June 30, 2006). 
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interest organizations or academic researchers, with cited public interest filers utilizing four different 
commercial data sources and academic researchers utilizing seven.  As this combination of results thus 
indicates, not only did a wide array of commercial data sources figure very prominently in the analyses 
relevant to the media ownership decision, but utilization of these data sources appears to have been very 
unequally distributed across the various stakeholder groups, with the public interest and scholarly 
research communities exhibiting far less usage of these sources.  The imbalance exhibited in these 
findings may simply be a result of the FCC more frequently citing the comments of industry stakeholders 
than the work of academic or public interest researchers, though the literature on the role of research in 
the policymaking process discussed previously would suggest that such a tendency would itself be a 
function of policymakers’ preference for relying upon the submissions of stakeholders who engage in 
empirical analysis.116
The Need for Improved Access to Commercial Data Sources for Policy Researchers 
The extent of the commercialization of policy-relevant data contributes to an analytical imbalance 
that strikes at the core of the functioning of a representative democracy and the role of information in the 
democratic process.  There are a wide range of benefits that arise from a policymaking environment in 
which access to the relevant data is widely distributed.  Arzberger, et al. provide perhaps one of the most 
thorough catalogs of the social and economic benefits of expansive data access for researchers: 
Open access to, and sharing of, data reinforces open scientific inquiry, encourages diversity of  
analysis and opinion, promotes new research, makes possible the testing of new or alternative  
hypotheses and methods of analysis, supports studies on data collection methods and  
measurement, facilitates the education of new researchers, enables the exploration of topics not  
envisioned by the initial investigators, and permits the creation of new data sets when data from  
multiple sources are combined.117 
116 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
117 P Arzberger, et al. Promoting Access to Public Research Data for Scientific, Economic, and Social Development. 
3 Data Science Journal 135, 139 (2004). 
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As Nobel Laureate Joshua Ledberg has argued, “Data are the building blocks of knowledge and the seeds 
of discovery. . . . They are also the foundation of sensible public policy in our democracy.”118 
Consequently, the greater the diversity of sources of analysis that have the ability to meaningfully 
participate in the policymaking process, the greater the likelihood that the information that ultimately 
guides, and is utilized by, decision-makers will reflect the full range of policy options, considerations, and 
concerns.  Ultimately, as the National Research Council has noted, “The benefits of providing wider 
access to microdata for researchers and policy analysts are better informed public policies.”119
Conversely, there are substantial dangers associated with a policy environment in which access to 
the data that fuels policy analysis and guides policy decision-making is limited.   Specifically, legitimate 
concerns regarding public confidence in its policymakers arise from any policymaking process that relies 
upon data and analysis that can not be subjected fully to public scrutiny and reassessment.  Thus, “Public 
access to data ensures greater transparency, which lends legitimacy to the regulatory process.  
Transparency is a valuable aspect of public decision-making in a democracy.”120 To the extent that the 
privatization of data undermines this transparency, public confidence in its policy decision-makers 
suffers.  Feld addresses this issue within the specific context of communications policymaking, noting 
that “no one has a monopoly on wisdom.  Scholars and advocates have a right and responsibility to verify 
the FCC’s research – an impossibility if the FCC cannot release the underlying data.”121 
In the end, from a purely normative perspective, it seems fairly clear that in a well-functioning 
democracy public policy should be made with publicly available data.  For there to be increasingly 
privileged and unequal access to the raw data that guide policy decisions represents a significant failing in 
the construction of our policymaking process and, consequently, a significant roadblock to effective 
public policymaking and public confidence in policy decisions. 
 
118 Collection of Information Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Prop. Of 
the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Joshua Ledberg, Nobel laureate, on behalf of 
NAS, NAE, IOM and the American Association for the Advancement of Science ), available at 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-lede.htm. 
119 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17 at 1. 
120 Cohen & Hahn, supra note 46 at 536. 
121 See supra note 89. 
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Recommendations 
In light of the multi-faceted problem outlined up to this point, this section develops a set of 
possible paths for improving access to data that are used in communications policymaking and policy 
analysis.  It is worth noting that, to this point, to the extent that policies have addressed issues of access to 
data used in policymaking, they have focused on data gathered with public funds,122 on the quality of 
research conducted with publicly funded data,123 or, on the issue of privacy and confidentiality concerns 
associated with the dissemination of data gathered from individual citizens.124 Yet, as this paper has 
demonstrated, private data are perhaps more central to contemporary communications policymaking 
today than are public data, yet little, if anything, has been done to address the access imbalances created 
by this situation and their implications for policymaking.   
Ideally, of course, a reversal of the trends toward greater privatization of data and reduced 
government involvement in the data gathering process would be the most direct solution to the 
information asymmetry that currently affects communications policymaking.  Legislation requiring that 
the Federal Communications Commission actively engage in a specific set of data gathering activities, 
mandating that all such data be made available to the public in a timely and user-friendly fashion, and 
providing the necessary increase in the Commission’s budget so that it could adequately engage in these 
activities, would significantly address the problems outlined in this paper.  Or, perhaps a separate 
government agency devoted specifically to data gathering related to communications and information 
 
122 The Data Access Act, was passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998).  This Act requires that the data needed to validate a federally funded study 
be made available to requesting parties through the Freedom of Information Act.  This Act is also referred to as the 
Shelby Amendment, after sponsoring Senator Richard Shelby.  See also Richard Shelby, Accountability and 
Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION, 369 
(2000). 
123 The Data Quality Act, which was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill, section 515 of the Treasury and 
General Government Appropriations Rider for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-55 
(2001), provides mechanisms for interested parties to file complaints about the quality of regulatory science by 
requiring federal agencies to develop formal procedures for ensuring the quality, objectivity, and integrity of the  
information that they disseminate.  Thus, like the Data Quality Act, it too focuses on publicly funded data and 
research.  Studies produced by external stakeholders, or that are part of public filings are not covered under the Act. 
124 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17. 
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policy could be developed,125 or such responsibilities placed within the purview of another existing 
government entity such as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (which 
already conducts some significant data gathering). 
Such an approach would be particularly desirable in that it would allow for a better tailoring of 
the data being gathered to the nature of the policy issues generally requiring attention.  This would stand 
in stark contrast to the contemporary situation, in which data gathered to serve entirely different needs 
(i.e., the needs of communications firms, investors, and advertisers) are essentially “repurposed”126 to 
address policy questions. As Hesmondhalgh and Pratt have noted, although cultural industries (such as 
media and communications) produce substantial amounts of data to facilitate their operations, there 
remains a concern with the “fitness for purpose,” of such data for research purposes, as “Such data are 
functional for market making; but not for an understanding that will provide an evidence base for policy 
making or intellectual inquiry.”127 
As a reflection of this perspective, we can consider something as simple as the fact that, today, 
the FCC assesses the media system along geographical parameters established and measured by 
commercial audience measurement firms.128 Thus, media markets as defined by Nielsen and Arbitron 
become the FCC’s units of analysis.  There are, of course, many reasons why adhering to the market 
parameters utilized within the regulated industries is useful – particularly in relation to economic policy 
 
125 See Richard A. Peterson, The Role of Research in Developing Cultural Policy. 13 J. ARTS MGT. & LAW 190, 
191-192 (1983), for a similar proposal – but one that focuses on cultural policy, (proposing an agency to facilitate 
academic and private-sector research on cultural policy issues via the establishment of a data archive and the regular 
collection of information at both the national and local levels.  This agency would serve only a data-gathering 
function, as opposed to being involved in analysis or policymaking.). 
126 Repurposing refers to the practice in which content/information produced for one market is later re-used or resold 
in additional markets. Repurposing takes advantage of the public good nature of media/information products in that 
content is sold multiple times without additional production costs being incurred.  See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE,
BEING DIGITAL 63 (1995) (“Repurposing goes hand in hand with the birth of any new medium. Film reused plays, 
radio resold performances, and TV recycled movies”). 
127 David Hesmondhalgh and Andy C. Pratt, Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy. 11 INT’L J. CULTURAL POLICY 
10 (2005). 
128 Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003) par. 274: The Commission notes, “we will rely on the Arbitron 
Metro Survey Area [Arbitron Metro] as the presumptive market.” In addition, in par. 280, the Commission notes that 
it “traditionally has relied on BIA’s Media Access Pro database to obtain information about particular Arbitron 
Metros.” See also David M. Hunsaker: Duopoly Wars: Analysis and Case Studies of the FCC’s Radio Contour 
Overlap Rules, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 21 (1994). 
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questions involving market competition.  However, when we think more broadly about the mandate for 
communications policymaking – particularly in relation to the role of our media system in the democratic 
process – the fact that no systematic data are gathered that organize media outlets along political 
jurisdictions is quite unfortunate.129 
The importance of such an approach is illustrated by the fact that some highly regarded 
communications policy research in recent years that has examined the relationship between media 
sources, media content, and citizen engagement in the political process, was only able to be conducted 
after the difficult and laborious process of roughly aligning political participation data (which are 
gathered and reported according to political jurisdictions) with media source and content data that are 
gathered and reported according to market definitions.130 To the extent that policymakers should concern 
themselves with the political functions of the media outlets they regulate, it is surprising that neither they, 
nor the broader research community, has access to systematic data that map our media system according 
to local political parameters.   
Along related lines, intensive usage and detailed scrutiny of the primary source of media market, 
ownership, and financial data utilized by the FCC and many other stakeholders in the policymaking 
process – the BIA Media Access Pro nation-wide database of television stations, radio stations, and 
 
129 For a thorough critique of the weaknesses of Arbitron data as a tool for communications policymaking and policy 
analysis, see David Gunzerath, An Analysis of the Proposed Use of Arbitron Data to Define Radio Markets, 
Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters in MM Docket 00-244, Attachment B (Feb. 26, 2001)at 17-
18 (“Arbitron’s radio audience reports are specifically designed as a means through which buyers and sellers can 
reach agreement on the relative value of radio airtime in the commercial marketplace. . . . But the application of 
Arbitron data to other, unrelated purposes – such as defining radio markets and determining levels of competition 
and diversity that exist within them – uses this information in ways for which it is poorly suited.”) 
130 See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Joel Waldfogel, Media Markets and Localism: Does Local News en Espanol 
Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout (2006) (unpublished working paper); Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Joel Waldfogel, 
Strength in Numbers: Group Size and Political Mobilization  J. Law & Econ. (2005); Lisa George and Joel 
Waldfogel. Does the New York Times Spread Ignorance and Apathy? (unpublished working paper).  This series of 
studies demonstrates the extent to which access to local information sources positively affects political participation 
– a finding with dramatic implications for media policies related to the principle of localism.  Conducting such 
research requires aligning media market data with voting behavior data.  See also Scott Althaus and Todd Trautman, 
The Impact of Television Market Size on Voter Turnout (2004) (unpublished manuscript, paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, 4) (“Our analysis of turnout draws upon 
aggregate voting data at the sub-county level for nearly every area in the continental United States, over four 
election cycles.  We join data on the boundaries of television markets provided by Nielsen Media Research with 
turnout and demographic data from the Record of American Democracy Project, which assembled comprehensive 
voting data for every precinct in the continental United States over the years 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990”). 
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newspapers – reveals that many minority-targeted and foreign-language newspapers are not included in 
the database.131 Similarly, the standardized ratings reports generated by Arbitron for the radio industry 
somewhat selectively report minority audience compositions for individual stations; limiting such 
reporting only to those markets in which there is a substantial minority population.132 Regardless of the 
reasons for these omissions (no doubt they are a reflection of the economics of database generation and a 
reflection of the allocation of demand priorities of the primary users of the databases), the end result is an 
inaccurate, incomplete portrait of the media system.  The nature of omissions such as these undermines 
analyses related to vital communications policy issues such as the diversity of information sources 
available in media markets and the extent to which minority interests and concerns are being served at the 
local level.133
These examples are meant to illustrate how data gathering freed of market imperatives could 
potentially better serve communications policymaking and policy analysis.  Certainly publicly-funded 
data gathering brings with it its own set of potential pitfalls, but the purely commercially-driven data 
infrastructure towards which we are migrating raises the possibility of increased disconnects between 
policy questions and the information available to answer those questions – above and beyond the access 
disparity issue which has been the focus of this paper. 
Absent – or perhaps best, in addition to – progress on the governmental data gathering front, 
efforts must also be made to enhance researchers’ access to relevant commercial data sources.  In 
pursuing such options, it seems reasonable to explore more effective mechanisms for balancing the needs 
 
131 Mark Lloyd, et al., Measuring Local Media Diversity, 8 (Unpublished working paper, Center for American 
Progress. On file with author). This research project utilized BIA data to analyze the diversity of sources across 
different media available in individual media markets, but in so doing, “found that the BIA database did not 
adequately identify the ethnic media in the analyzed markets.” 
132 Philip M. Napoli, Audience Valuation and Minority Media: An Analysis of the Determinants of the Value of 
Radio Audiences, 46 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 169, 174 (2002) (“It is important to note that Arbitron does 
not report ethnic composition for stations in all of the markets that it measures, but only in those markets where 
there is a significant minority population; nor does the company provide data on ethnic groups other than African 
Americans or Hispanics in any of its markets”).  In addition, nearly half of all radio stations in the United States are 
not located within Arbitron-defined markets, further complicating the use of Arbitron data for certain types of 
analyses. See Gunzerath, supra note 129 at 8 (“However, it is vital to recognize that approximately 50 percent of all 
U.S. radio stations are not located in an Arbitron market”) (emphasis in original). 
133 See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 125-152, 203-224 (2001), for a discussion 
of the media policy principles of diversity and localism. 
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of researchers and commercial database vendors in a manner that recognizes the substantial public interest 
in policy research.134 
One possible approach would involve the creation of a consortium of academic and public 
interest policy researchers to collectively negotiate terms that could facilitate greater access to the relevant 
data sources than is currently taking place.  Such a proposal would no doubt require not only substantial 
financial resources (be they from the academic/public interest organizations, or from external funders), 
but also a commitment on the part of the commercial data providers to make their data available under 
terms and conditions that meaningfully reflect how the broader public interest is served by such access.  It 
does seem safe to say that none of the commercial database providers whose products are used in the 
communications policymaking process consider the policy research community the primary, secondary, 
or even tertiary market for their products.  If that were the case, these data products likely would not exist, 
as the policy research community is far too small, and its resources far too limited, to meaningfully 
support the creation of these data sets.  To the extent, then, that the policy research community represents 
a largely negligible part of the revenue stream for most commercial data providers, this may encourage 
some flexibility in terms of how this community, when dealt with as a collective, is treated by the data 
providers.  Of course, such an access model would need to rigorously protect the existing revenue streams 
of the commercial data providers and ensure that the access provided to the (relatively small) policy 
research community did not create opportunities for other customer bases to gain access to the data.  It 
seems perfectly realistic that such a balance could be struck.   
At the very least, such an initiative could work towards establishing greater formalization and 
transparency in relation to the institutional rules and policies surrounding data access and usage.  There 
often is a very ad hoc nature to the processes of gaining access to the relevant data sources.135 Pricing 
typically varies substantially in relation the resources of the potential purchaser, and in relation to how the 
 
134 See Greenbaum, supra note 64 at 431 (2003) (“copyright law . . . ought to favor the advancement of science over 
unsubstantiated suspicions of the commercial database vendors,” p. 435). 
135 Supra note 116 at 141 (“To reach the necessary transparency in the tasks and responsibilities of those involved, 
terms of access to and use of data that rest on tacit agreements should be made explicit and formalized.  A 
systematic and institutionalized approach is needed to help address operating characteristics of data access”). 
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data ultimately are to be used.  Access terms can similarly vary from data provider to data provider, and 
from client to client.  These tendencies are, in many ways, inevitable byproducts of the business models 
surrounding public goods, where the substantial opportunities to engage in price discrimination are 
essential to the viability of public good production.136 Nonetheless, to the extent that some more 
formalization and transparency in transactions can be developed for situations in which the primary use of 
the data is for policy analysis, then improvement to the imbalances in data access that currently exist in 
the policy analysis playing field could be achieved. 
Also toward these ends, policy researchers should engage in a concerted effort to compile and 
study the non-confidential components of model standard licensing agreements in an effort to establish a 
broader understanding of standard access terms, to identify exemplary approaches, and to facilitate better-
informed negotiations in those instances when data access is being sought.137 This too could help 
contribute to reducing the extremely ad hoc nature of how policy researchers typically engage with 
commercial data providers. 
A final possible mechanism for improving the current situation might be legislation that specifies 
that once a data source is utilized in any study submitted to, or conducted by, a regulatory agency, the 
underlying data for that research must be publicly available for reanalysis, regardless of whether the 
underlying data come from public or private data sources, or were obtained/gathered via public or private 
funds.  Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 138 with the intention of enhancing 
public access to “agency records.”  There has been dispute in the courts over whether data compiled by 
third parties constitute agency records,139 and while the Shelby Amendment has since been enacted to 
 
136 See BRUCE M. OWEN AND STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS, 23-24 (1992) (“Even a monopoly producer 
of a public good from which free riders can be easily excluded may need to practice price discrimination among its 
customers”).  Within the context of data, this often results in there being no clear “fixed” price.  Rather, pricing 
becomes quite flexible in accordance with the nature of the presumed usage of the data as well as the perceived level 
of demand (and resources) of the potential purchaser. 
137 See supra note 116 at 148, for a similar suggestion within the specific context of access to publicly-funded data, 
(“Consider conducting or coordinating a study to compile model licensing agreements and templates for access to 
and sharing of publicly funded data”). 
138 5 U.S.C. Section 552.  
139 Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that medical data gathered by a 
private entity with the support of a federal grant did not constitute agency records (“Congress undoubtedly sought to 
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enhance public access to data gathered with public funds, the increased importance of privately funded 
research conducted with commercially gathered data to the policymaking process (particularly in 
communications) raises questions about whether existing legislation sufficiently addresses the principles 
of transparency and accountability on which FOIA and the Shelby Amendment are based.140 As Justices 
Brennan and Marshall noted in their dissent in Forsham v. Harris, “One cannot even begin to evaluate an 
agency action without access to the raw data on which the conclusions were based.”141 Consequently, the 
public versus private distinction in relation to the origins of the relevant data may need to be considered 
secondary.  Instead, the focus should be on whether “the nexus between the agency and the requested 
information is close, and [whether] the importance of the information to public understanding of the 
decisions or the operation of the agency is great.”142
A more expansive definition of “agency records” may need to be explored – one in which the 
contemporary reality of the importance and influence of data gathered by commercial vendors, used in 
studies conducted by interested stakeholders, and ultimately utilized by policymakers in their decision-
making, is better recognized.  The Supreme Court has developed a two prong test for identifying “agency 
records”: 1) the documents are either created or obtained by the agency; and 2) under agency control at 
the time of the FOIA request.143 It is the issue of “control” and how it is defined that generally precludes 
more meaningful access to any commercial data used in policymaking, as the access terms associated 
with the purchase or license of the data typically are quite restrictive in terms of how the data can be used 
 
expand public rights of access to Government information when it enacted the Freedom of Information Act, but that 
expansion was a finite one.  Congress limited access to ‘agency records,’ but did not provide any definition of 
‘agency records’ in the Act”).  See also Tax Analysts v. U.S. Department of Justice, 913 F.Supp. 599, 606-607 
(1996) (In which access was denied to portions of the Department of Justice’s JURIS database that contained 
information provided by legal publisher West Publishing due to the fact that the DOJ did not have “control” of the 
data provided to the agency). 
140 See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an 
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, ndded to check against corruption and to hold 
the governors accountable to the governed”). 
141 Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 190 (1980). 
142 Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188-189 (1980). 
143 United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144-145 (1989). 
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or circulated.144 As a result, the “control” threshold is difficult to meet in the context of commercial data 
sources.  This situation becomes increasingly problematic if public decision-making becomes increasingly 
reliant upon private data.  Thus, a more lenient definition of agency control of its records, one that is less 
sensitive to the various usage restrictions that commercial data providers typically impose upon their data, 
would be necessary to increase the extent to which FOIA facilitates expanded access to the commercial 
data sources used in policymaking.  An expansion of FOIA and the Shelby Amendment that in some 
manner accounts for the commercial data used in studies conducted by, or submitted to, and ultimately, 
used by, regulatory agencies is necessary to address the serious and systematic data inequalities that have 
been outlined.   
Conclusion 
 This paper has argued that a confluence of circumstances: the growing centrality of empirical 
research to public policymaking; the increased reliance of policymakers on externally-conducted 
research; and the increased privatization of the key data utilized in policy analysis, all contribute to a 
growing imbalance that can undermine effective and representative communications policymaking.  This 
paper has documented the centrality of commercial data sources to communications policymaking and 
policy analysis and has presented arguments in favor of efforts to reduce the current imbalances in data 
access that characterize the contemporary communications policymaking and policy analysis 
environment.  Finally, this paper has offered a series of suggestions for reducing this imbalance and 
providing more equitable access to the data source that are central to communications policy research.  
Future research should explore more extensively the legal issues surrounding access to commercial data 
sources within policymaking contexts, particularly in terms of possible relationships to FOIA, copyright 
law, and fair use considerations. 
 
144 See Tax Analysts v. United States Department of Justice, 913 F.Supp. 599, 600 (1996) (ruling that  the 
Department of Justice could deny access to its JURIS database because its contract with West Publishing 
“significantly restricted how it could use, transfer and/or dispose of the data”). 
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Table 1: Commercial Data Sources Used in Media Ownership Policy Analysis and Users
Data Source Industry FCC Pub. Int. Academic
Databases
BIA Media Access Pro x x x  x 
Bear Stearns       x 
Adams Media Research      x 
Arbitron Radio Market Reports     x    x 
CNW Marketing Research Surveys     x 
Duncan’s American Radio      x   x 
Morgan Stanley       x 
Newspaper Advertising Source     x x   x 
Nielsen Media Research 
 Nielsen Station Index     x x      x   
Nielsen Television Index    x 
 Viewers in Profile     x 
Scarborough Research: Primenext Multimarket Data   x 
Service Quality Analytics Data (SQAD)     x   x 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat      x 
Standard Rate & Data Service     x 
UBS Warburg       x 
Vickers Stock Research          x 
VoiceTrak       x 
 
Industry Directories
Ayer Directory of Publications      x 
Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook    x x       x 
Burelle’s Media Directory      x 
CBEMA Industry Marketing Data Book        x 
Editor & Publisher International Yearbook   x 
Television & Cable Factbook     x x 
Warren Cable & Station Coverage Atlas     x 
 
Trade Publications/Reports
Cable Television Advertising Bureau: Cable TV Facts  x 
Radio and Records Magazine      x       x 
Kagan Research 
Broadband Cable Financial Databook    x 
Cable Operator Revenues     x 
Cable TV Financial Databook    x x 
Cable TV Investor      x 
Economics of Basic Cable Networks    x 
Economics of TV Programming    x 
Media Index      x 
State of DBS       x 
Media Dynamics TV Dimensions     x 
Myers Reports       x 
National Association of Broadcasters TV Financial Report x x 
Nielsen Media Research Report on Television   x x 
Veronis Suhler Stevenson Communications Industry Forecast x x 
